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THE LAW AND EDUCATION: SUPREME COURT
DOCTRINE REACHES CRITICAL MASS
*Thomas Fischer
Back in the mid- 1960's, when most of those persons now recognized as author-
ities in the field1 were just getting their start, it might have been difficult to claim
that there was any such subject as "school law." Indeed, in those days I used to tell
my students: "The good news is that education law (the term I prefer to use) is a
fascinating and emerging subject; the bad news is that it is not a discrete field of
legal study."
The reason was that, until that point in time, virtually every United States Su-
preme Court decision dealing with a "school law" issue-and there were only a
handful -could be explained in terms of other, well-recognized legal fields. For
example, the famous "Dartmouth College Case,"2 the first education law decision
of the United States Supreme Court, could be explained in terms of state interfer-
ence with the private right of contract, protected by the Constitution.' Cases such
as Meyer v. Nebraska4 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters' could be explained in terms
of equal protection, teachers' and parents' "liberty" rights, and, in the latter case,
the right to free exercise of religion. Public school desegregation cases, beginning
with Brown v. Board of Education,8 obviously turned on the United States Consti-
tution's Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of "equal protection of the laws," and
particularly its objective of eliminating unwarranted public differentiation along
racial lines.'
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. A.B., University of Cincinnati, 1960; J.D., Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, 1966. All rights reserved.
1. To cite a representative, but not exhaustive, group: KERN ALEXANDER, SCHOOL LAW (1979); HARRY T.
EDWARDS AND VIRGINIA DAVIS NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1979); STEPHEN R. GOLDSTEIN AND
E. GORDON GEE, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (2d ed. 1980); PATRICIA A. HOLLANDER, LEGAL HANDBOOK OF
EDUCATION (1978); H.C. HUDGINS, JR. AND RICHARD J. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION (3d ed. 1991); WILLIAM A.
KAPuN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1979); FRANK R. KEMERER AND KENNETH L. DEUTSCH, CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS AND STUDENT LIFE (1979); WILLIAM G. MILLINTON, THE LAW AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT
(1979); ARVAL A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION (1989); MICHAEL A. OLIvAS,
THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION (1989); JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW (1984); E. EDMUND REUTTER, JR.,
THE LAW OF PUBUC EDUCATION (3d ed. 1985); MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (3d
ed. 1992).
2. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
3. Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "No State shall ... pass
any.. . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4.262 U.S. 390 (1923).
5. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (the so-called
"Civil War Amendments") all have a race-integrating goal. The Thirteenth and Fifteenth are the more express in
this regard, but it is the Fourteenth that has been the most potent, codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV and XV.
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Up until the 1960's, there seemed to be no need to create an independent body
of law labelled "school law," since the decisions of the nation's highest court could
easily be embraced within existing legal fields. But how the times have changed!
From the 1960's to the present, the United States Supreme Court has taken an
escalating number of cases involving schools, students and teachers. A number of
them involved racial integration of public schools in the wake of Brown. I Another
large body of Supreme Court case law dealt with the parameters that must be ob-
served in order to prevent public largesse, extended to private (chiefly parochial)
schools, from "establishing" religion. The latter is proscribed by the Constitution's
First Amendment, which requires the "separation" of church and state.9
Even if the numerous cases in these two large areas of Court jurisprudence are
excluded from our count, by my calculations the Supreme Court decided more
than forty education law cases since the mid- 1960's,far more than the Justices de-
cided in the Court's previous, 170-year history. As a result, most of the scholars
who are active in this field today literally grew up as students, practitioners and
educators during the period when education law came of age. It is the rich, para-
bolic growth of this field that this symposium issue is meant to address.
In this process of evolution, the Supreme Court and lower courts established a
series of benchmark propositions that are virtually unique to the field of education
law. Examples of these unique propositions are that the school environment is spe-
cial and fragile,10 and the corresponding need to protect it might permit an alloca-
tion of rights and responsibilities between individuals and the state that would
probably be unconstitutional if applied to any group of individuals and institu-
8. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457(1982); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick
(Penick II), 443 U.S. 449(1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Brinkman II), 443 U.S. 526(1979); Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), to name but a few of the more significant decisions.
9. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion .... "U.S. CONST. amend. I. This language has been said to call for
a "wall of separation" between church and state but has been differently interpreted by the Supreme Court over
the years.
Justice Black, writing for the majority in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), wrote: "The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could
not approve the slightest breach." Id. at 18. Black attributes the words to Thomas Jefferson, but in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), Justice Waite quotes Jefferson at length, in what seems to be a less-absolutist
view than Black's: "[Rieligion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; . .. he owes account to
none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the Government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,'
thus building a wall of separation between church and State.' Id. at 164 (citation omitted).
Well-known United States Supreme Court cases involving religion and schools include: Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), to name but a few.
10. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Inst. of Higher Educ., 45 F.R.D. 133, 136 (W.D. Mo. 1968). See also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986). Taking note of the uniqueness of the secondary school setting, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "[T]he exercise of rights of expression in the high schools, whether by students or
by others, is subject to reasonable constraints more restrictive than those constraints that can normally limit First
Amendment freedoms." Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 13:287
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tions. Consequently, teachers and administrative officials have been accorded
great discretion in managing the academy, particularly regarding academic deci-
sion-making, and their decisions are accorded the utmost respect by courts of
law. 1 Public school students are usually considered a "captive audience," and as
such do not enjoy the full rights of the public in general. Free speech prerogatives
can be limited in the interest of institutional goals, 12 warrantless searches can be
conducted,13 and qualitative academic judgments will escape court review almost
entirely unless they are "arbitrary and capricious."14
Students may be entitled to some "process" to protect against arbitrary decisions
by school officials, but far less process than would probably be accorded to others
faced with a similar exercise of state power."5 Younger children have fewer rights
than older students. Finally, school officials have near-absolute and unreviewable
control over activities considered part of their curricular or pedagogical responsi-
bilities."
I will mention here only a few of the many threads that merged into this remark-
able legal tapestry and leave it to the longer, more substantive articles in this sym-
posium and elsewhere to develop those themes fully.
What I want to stress is that it will no longer do for students and practitioners to
assume that if they know the law of property, contracts, crimes or individual
rights, they know how that jurisprudence is likely to be applied in a school setting.
As these brief remarks illustrate, that law is somewhat unique and still evolving.
The case that many scholars identify as being the genesis of the modern con-
tours of this field is not a Supreme Court case at all but one decided by the Fifth
Circuit. That case, Dixon v. Alabama,17 determined that a student's "right" to con-
tinue his education -although never concretely labelled a life, liberty or property
interest- required that some process be accorded him before he was involuntarily
terminated by the institution.18 Clearly, this case focuses on the relationship be-
tween the student and the institution, whereas earlier cases tended to focus on the
11. General Order, 45 F.R.D. at 135-36.
12. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1985).
13. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). TL.O. is the only U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with
school search. However, its "civil" or "administrative" search characteristics have been amplified in other non-
criminal (but also non-school) cases that could prove instructive to lawyers trying to fathom the constitutional
standards regulating civil search. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
14. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
15. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir, 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also James M. Picozzi, University Disciplinary Process: What's Fair,
What's Due, and What You Don't Get, 96 YALE L.J. 2132 (1987). Cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
16. Board of Curators of the Univ. ofMo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
17. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
18. At no place in the Dixon decision does the Court ever stipulate whether the "right" involved is one of life,
liberty or property, the traditional "rights" to which the entitlement of "due process" attaches, according to the
terms of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Notwithstanding, the Dixon Court, in order
to fashion a rule appropriate to the school environment, stated that the student's "interest" was one "of extremely
great value." Id. at 157.
19931
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relationship between parents and the institution or between the institution and/or
one of its teachers and the government.' 9 There was in the Dixon case, therefore, a
hint of a reordering of the relationship between students and public institutions
upon legal grounds.
Excepting the public school integration and parochial school funding cases
mentioned above, the Supreme Court picked up this theme of student constitu-
tional rights in its landmark decision Tinker v. Des Moines. 20 In Tinker, in Holmes-
ian dicta, Mr. Justice Fortas stated that: "[Ilt can hardly be argued that students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights. . at the schoolhouse gate."2' If that be
so, we needed only learn how many rights and of what sort the Supreme Court
would gainsafe for them as against the school's authority. Mr. Justice Black, dis-
senting in Tinker, suggested that this was an improper tack and that it was better
for students to be seen and not heard.22 In the long term, Justice Black has been
proved somewhat correct.23 In the shorter term, however, there was an explosion
of school law cases and much fresh precedent.
Because private institutions were engaged in the essentially "public function" of
primary and secondary education," it was briefly hoped that all private and paro-
chial schools would be found to be engaged in "state action," and thus brought
within the ambit of the Constitution.25 However, that hope was dashed in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn.26
The Tinker case also suggested that students retain certain expressive rights
within the school environment, 27 but that hope, too, was significantly modified by
two more-recent decisions.28
To be certain, the guarantee of due process - originally articulated in Dixon -
continued to apply to students, but it was significantly reduced in content by later
decisions 29 and is virtually non-existent in academic situations."
The principle of separation of church and state, which has long occupied the
United States Supreme Court, was fairly aggressively enforced in the school envi-
ronment. The theory was that state aid to private (chiefly parochial) schools would
19. Examples of such cases include: Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
21. Id. at 506.
22. Id. at 524-25 (Black, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1985); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
24. Robert M. O'NeiI, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFF. L. REv. 155 (1969-70).
25. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946).
26. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
27. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
28. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986).
29. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
30. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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"establish" religion in violation of the Constitution's First Amendment."1 How-
ever, I have never fully understood why textbooks provided by the state to parochial
schools would not "assist" religion (although refusing to provide textbooks to those
schools, on grounds of their religious nature, could be considered a "burden" on
the "free exercise" of religious choice, also prohibited by the First Amendment),
whereas public funding for maps and school transportation for field trips would of-
fend the principle of separation. I have always imagined that the reason must be
because the Court feared the money would be used to purchase maps of the Holy
Land, or support bus trips to the nearest cathedral to celebrate a holy day of obliga-
tion.
Humor aside, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the religion clauses
has roughly ferreted out any attempt to introduce religious influence into the
school environment" with some quixotic exceptions." The United States Con-
gress was forced to pass the Equal Access Act 4 in order to put religious activities
on an equal footing with secular activities in public schools." However, the Act
applies only to certain circumstances38 and does not extend to ecumenical invoca-
31. There are many examples of this, beginning principally with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
but one of the most complex and picayune is Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Reference is especially
made in the text below to the Wolman decision, Sections III and VIII, at 248-55.
32. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34. 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1984).
35. See generally Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
36. The Equal Access Act applies only when a "public secondary school .. receives Federal financial assist-
ance and ... has [created] a limited public forum" (i.e., allows other non-curricular groups to organize). 20
U.S.C. § 407 1(a).
1993]
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tions and benedictions at public school commencement services."' The effort also
sometimes takes novel twists38 and now may even be turning back on itself. "
I could continue at considerably greater length, but I expect the reader appreci-
ates the points I have sought to make in this brief introduction, namely, that the
field of education law is somewhat separate and distinct from other bodies of law,
and that it is evolving rapidly. It is necessary, indeed imperative, that anyone who
would enter and understand this field would not content themselves with a knowl-
edge of the law in other legal fields and apply that knowledge undiluted to the field
of education. Education practitioners must become sensitive to issues of the sort
that the articles in this symposium address in order to be certain that they are fol-
lowing the contours of this subtle and delicate new field of law.
There are many of us, I suspect, that do not feel that education has been alto-
gether improved by the entry of the law into its precincts, but enter it has. If we are
going to ensure that the law's role in education is constructive, then we must en-
sure that the frequently blunt instrument the law represents will enhance- and not
destroy - the elusive process of education and the unique environment of the acad-
emy which has been a mainstay of our democratic system.
37. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Bishop v. Delchamps, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992). In Bishop state university officials directed a
professor to refrain from injecting his religious beliefs into his lectures. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11 th
Cir. 1991); and Roberts v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992), in which a public school district forbade a fifth-
grade teacher to read his Bible at his desk during a daily "silent reading period." Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d
1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
39. For example, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 61 U.S.L.W. 4549
(1993), a unanimous Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits by deciding that a public school board's
regulation (pursuant to state statute), that opened public school facilities during non-instructional hours to citi-
zen's groups for various activities, constituted a limited public forum, to which religious groups could not be
denied access on an equal basis. Cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The decision in Lamb's Chapel
appears to relax, if only slightly, the strict "separation" concerns that the Court evidenced in a prior line of case
decisions referenced in part at fn. 9, supra. Thus, Lambs Chapel levels the playing field somewhat for religious
groups and reflects a concern for their rights not always evident in cases like Lemon and Meek.
Evidencing even more tolerance for religion in the state/education interface is Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, 61 U.S.L.W. 4641 (1993). In Zobrest, a five-four majority of the Court held that a deaf student,
attending a Roman Catholic high school, was entitled to a publicly-paid sign language interpreter, pursuant to a
federal disability statute. The majority found the statute to be religion-neutral, and in any event it did not confer a
direct benefit on the school. The statute's purpose and primary effect may indeed be neutral (to aid the dis-
abled) - although two dissenters fiercely contest this - but state oversight of parochial school operations (entan-
glement) is unavoidable, contrary to a strict interpretation of Lemon. Cf Board of Education of the Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). The Court simply seems more tolerant of this prospect in
1993 than it did in 1971.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 61 U.S.L.W. 4587 (1993), although not an education
case, also suggests that the Court has grown more sensitive to protecting religious prerogative from (it would
appear here, intentional) state interference, even when the practices lie far outside the religious mainstream. Cf
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990); Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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